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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS
BAN RUPTcY-DEBTs PROVABLE-BREAcH OF PLEDGE.-The plaintiff gave a
note with collateral security to the defendants who repledged the collateral
in violation of the agreement, and were adjudged bankrupts before the
note came due. The collateral was sold by the subpledgees and the plaintiff
tendered the amount of the debt to the holders of the note, demanding the
collateral. The defendants were discharged in bankruptcy and the plaintiff
then sued them, relying on the demand and refusal as a cause of action
arising subsequent to the time of bankruptcy. Held, that the cause of
action did not grow out of the rejected tender but out of the breach of
the pledge and so was a claim on contract provable under the bankruptcy
act and barred by the discharge. Wood v. Fisk, 109 N. E. 177 (N. Y.).
CAmIms--AssOcIATION WiTH COMMODITY CARRIED.-Mere ownership by rail-
way stockholders of stock in a coal company does not constitute a viola.
tion of the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act, making it unlawful for
any railroad to have an Interest, direct or indirect, in any article which
It carries In interstate commerce. However, a contract between a railroad
and a coal company whereby the coal company is constituted a mere
agent of the railroad Is in violation of that act. U. S. v. D. L. and W.
R. R. Co. and the D. L. and W. Coal Co., 35 Sup. Ct. 873. For a discussion
of the Hepburn Act in relation to this case see note on p. 59 of this issue.
COMMERCE-POWER OF CONGRESS To REGULATE INTRASTATE RATES.-The
plaintiff transportation company, a common carrier of passengers be-
tween a point on the shore of California and the Island of Santa Catalina,
both of which places are within the same county of the state, though
separated by a stretch of open sea, challenged the right of the state rail-
road commission to fix their rates, claiming that the business was subject
exclusively to the regulating power of Congress. Held, that although
the route led over open sea, in the absence of Federal interposition, the
transportation was a subject of local action. Wilmington Transp. Co. v.
Railroad Con., 35 Sup. Ct. 276. This case overrules Pac. S. S. Co. v. R. R.
Comrs., 9 Sawy. 253, 18 Fed. 10.
COMMERcE- STATE REGULATION-TRANSPORTING INTOXICATING LIQuos-
WEBRKErNYox AcT.-The defendant express company was indicted for
bringing into the state and delivering certain intoxicating liquors in
local option territory. Section 2569a of the statutes of Kentucky pro-
vides that It shall be unlawful for any public or private carrier to bring
into, deliver or distribute in any county, district, precinct, town or city
where the sale of Intoxicating liquors has been prohibited, any spiritous,
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquor. Held, that the shipments into the
state were not subject to the Kentucky statute above stated, because as ap-
plied to interstate shipments the statute was void as an attempt by the state
to regulate commerce among the states; and that the Webb-Kenyon law,
which provides that shipments into a state, territory, etc., of intoxicating
liquor which is intended by any person interested therein to be received,
possessed, sold or In any manner used, either in the original package
or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state, etc., does not apply
where the liquor is Intended for the personal use of the recipient and
his family; the highest court In Kentucky having held that such use was
not prohibited by the laws of Kentucky. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,
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35 Sup. Ct. 824. For a similar case see Ex parte Peede (Texas 1914),
170 S. W. 749. The question of the constitutionality and scope of the
Webb-Kenyon law is discussed In a note on page 55 of this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHTS OF ALIENS-CONFINEMENT AWAITING TRANS-
POBTATIO.-The question as to the legal rights of an alien, guilty of
acts making his deportation expedient, but held because the present
European conflict made his deportation Impossible, came recently before
the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
relator was held under a warrant for his removal to Germany, but there
being no regular ocean passenger service between America and Germany,
he sought release by habeas corpus proceedings. The court held that his
detention was not illegal and that his only relief lay through action of
the executive branch of the government. United States ex rel v. Schlimm,
222 Fed. 96. Where a Chinese woman after final hearing on habeas
corpus had been remanded to a marshal for deportation on the vessel
on which she arrived and the vessel had departed, she was not entitled
to ball pending the time of departure of the next vessel. In re Ah Moy on
Habeas Corpus, 21 Fed. 808. Reviewed in 113 U. S. 216.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CIVIL RIGHTS-RACE SEGREoATION.-On appeal from
a conviction for violation of a race segregation ordinance equally operative
on black and white races and providing that it shall not abridge any
constitutional rights to use or possess property, subject to reasonable
police regulations, it was held that such an ordinance was a reasonable
exercise of the police power, on the ground of maintenance of public
health and public peace. Further, that such an exercise of police power
as provided for did not destroy vested property rights, but was a reason-
able restriction of use. Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S. W. 472 (Ky.).
For discussion of constitutionality of such ordinances see page 70 of this
issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PROcESS OF LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AcTs.-A workmen's compensation law requiring employers to take out
insurance or furnish proof of ability to pay, or suffer penalty, and further
taking from the employer defenses of assumed risk, contributory negli-
gence, and negligence of fellow servant, but making recovery under
the act full satisfaction to the employee, is not invalid as depriving the
employer of property without due process of law contrary to Cons. U. S.,
Amend. 14, the act being justifiable under the state's police power. Jensen
v. Southern Pac. Co., 109 N. E. 600 (N. Y.). For a discussion of these
acts in relation to the police power see page 86 of this Issue.
COMMERCE-INTERSTATE COMMERcE-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.-
In a suit under the New York act for compensation for death of a work-
man employed in unloading a steamship owned by a railroad but not
connecting with its line, it was objected that the employee was engaged
in interstate commerce within the scope of the Federal Employers' Act.
Held, that the Federal act did not apply to such unconnected lines. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-EARLY CLOSING LAws.-A law re-
quiring all mercantile and commercial houses in cities of over 10,000 in
the State of Utah, to close at six p. m. every business day except during
the week preceding Christmas, but exempting drug stores and provision
houses, was held unconstitutional in that while it purported to regulate
the working hours of employees in mercantile establishments, It applied
to businesses conducted without help. Further that as It applied to cities
of a population of 10,000 only, it amounted to class legislation, and also
was objectionable in that It affected the right to alienate property. Sayville
v. Corless, 151 .Pac. 51.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE--"GRANDFATHER CLAUSE".-A
amcndment to the Oklahoma constitution prescribing a literacy test for
suffrage, but exempting those, among others, whose ancestors were on
June 1st, 1866, entitled to vcte under any form of government, held un-
constitutional in that it set up an unjust standard which would per-
petuate the conditions sought to be destroyed by the 15th Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. Guinn v. U. S., 35 Sup. ct. 926. A Maryland
statute prescribing a certain literacy test, but exempting from its opera-
tion those whose ancestors were on January 1st, 1868, entitled to vote
at any state election, was held unconstitutional on the same grounds.
Myers v. Anderson, 35 Sup. Ct. 9?3. The intention to discriminate between
the black and white races was drawn from the date fixed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-WORMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs-FEDERAL AcT-
EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN INTESTATE CoMmERCE.-In a suit under the Illinois
statute for compensation for death of a workman sustained while em-
ployed in repairing an engine used in interstate commerce, held, that the
deceased was at the time of the accident engaged in interstate commerce
and therefore the state statute did not apply. Staley v. Illinois Cent.
R. R. Co., 109 N. E. 32. See note on page 52 of this issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs-EQUAL PROTEcTION
OF LAws.-The claimant, suing under the state compensation act, was
injured while working on a steamship at her pier. The case was there-
fore one under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The defendant
objected that if the state act applied it was unconstitutional in that It
denied the equal protection of the laws. Held, that the state act was in
no sense a proceeding in ren to enforce a maritime lien, but was a
substitute for the common law remedy and therefore might exist con-
currently with the remedy in admiralty. That the employer was subject
to two remedies after the passage of the act precisely as he was before
its passage, the law amounting to a mere substitution. In re Walker, 109
N. E. 604 (N. Y.). A recent Washington case contains an apparently con-
flicting opinion. The relator was injured while in the employ of a steam-
ship company. The Industrial Commission rejected his demand on juris-
dictional grounds and in the Federal Court judgment was given for the
defendant because the Commission had made no demand on the ship
company. In mandamus proceedings to force the Industrial Commission
to collect premiums from the ship company so as to obtain jurisdiction
and authorize payment of compensation, the Supreme Court held that
the Industrial Insurance Act did not cover cases in admiralty, and that
the employee's sole remedy was by suit in the Federal Court. State ex tel.
Jarvis v. Daggett, 151 Pac. 648 (Wash.).
CONTRACTS--CONFLICT OF LAWS-EFFECT OF WAR MEASUxs.-A French
corporation made a loan to a German corporation. The defendants were
sureties. In a suit for repayment by the French corporation the defend-
ants pleaded that by the laws of Germany the debtor was forbidden to
pay any money to the plaintiff, and second, that by the laws of France
the time of payment of the indebtedness had been extended to a time
subsequent to the commencement of the action. The court held the
first defense bad in that the obligation might have become binding
before the passage of the German law, but sustained the second defense
on the ground that because of the moratorium no cause of action had
arisen, and as the question was not one of proceedure, the French law
governed. Compagnie General P. & P. v. Herzig & Sons, 158 X. 7. Sup. 717.
Divoac--ALMToNY-SuRvIvAL.-During an action for alimony due and un-
paid the plaintiff died. On a motion to substitute in her place the
executor of her last will and testament, it was objected that the cause
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of action did not survive. Held, that the right to collect alimony due
and unpaid at the time of the wife's death might be enforced by her
personal representatives. Van Ness v. Ransom. 109 N. E. 593 (N. Y.).
This point has not been passed on under Sec. 105, R. S. Mo. 1909. It has
been held that a decree awarding alimony pendente lite is a final judg-
ment so as to be a preferred claim against the estate of the deceased
husband. Estate of Win. F. Smith, 122 Cal. 162. A writ of scire facias
was held maintainable against husband's personal representatives for
alimony due. Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353. Sloan v. Cox, 4 Hayw.
(Tenn.) 75.
ELECTION OF REMIEDIES-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT.-Bringing an
action under a state employers' liability act with subsequent discontinuance
does not bar an action in the Federal Court under the Federal employers'
liability act. Hogan v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 223 Federal 890.
EXECUTORS AN) ADMINISTRATORS-SALES-PROPER SUBJECTs-DONATION CER-
TIFICATF.S.-In the absence of circumstances creating an estoppel on the
part of heirs, an administrator can pass no title to a donation certificate
from the state to the heirs, since such certificate is not a part of the
estate, being a mere gratuity, and, therefore, not subject to administration.
Moody v. Bonham, 178 S. W. 1020 (Texas).
FRAUD--MFASURE OF DAIIAGES.-In an action for fraud in the sale of
stock; held. the measure of damages is the difference at the time of
purchase between its actual value and what its value would have been
had the representations been true. Whitney v. Lynch, 109 N. E. 826 (Mass.).
Contra:-plaintiff may only recover the money invested and interest. Smith
v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125; so in Bank v. Byers, 189 Mo. 627.
INJUNCTION-INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMIENT-BLACK LIsT.-On bill in
equity by workman against a manufacturers' association to restrain them
from interfering with plaintiff's right to earn livelihood, by means of
a black list, held, that the plaintiff's participation in the strike, carried
on in an unlawful manner by the union to which he belonged, precluded
him from obtaining active aid in a court of equity. Cornellier v. Haver-
hill Shoe Mfrs. Ass'n, 109 N. E. 643 (Mass.).
INTOXICATING LIQUoRS-NUIsANcE-"LOCKER SYSTEmI".-In an action of
debt for violations of a municipal ordinance making the distribution of
liquors among members Of a club, by any means whatsoever, an illegal
sale, held that charges for service of liquors in a former saloon to persons
informally associated, amounted to unlawful selling, though the per-
sons serving such liquor were not shown to have had any interest in the
liquor served. City of Decatur v. Schlick, 109 N. E. 737 (Ill.).
MANDAMUS-COMPELLINO PUBLICATION OF STATUTES-EVIDENE.-Plaintiffs
having a special interest in the publication of an act alleged to have be-
come law instituted mandamus proceedings to compel publication by the
Secretary of State. Parol evidence was offered to show that the chief
executive had first approved the bill before he vetoed it, as shown by the
record, but the court held that parol evidence contradicting the legislative
record provided for in the constitution was inadmissible and that the
mandamus proceedings must fail. Arkansas State Fair Ass'n v. Hodges,
178 S. W. 936 (Ark.).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMAPENSATION ACTs-AssUMPTIoN OF
RISK BY CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMFNT.-In a tort action for death of em-
ployee paid to repair defective apparatus, held that contractual assump-
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tion of risk is not matter of defense taken from the employer by a
Compensation Act providing that it shall be no defense that an employee
voluntarily assumed the risk of the injury. Ashton v. Boston and M. R.
Co. (Mass.), 109 N. E. 820.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-FORCE OF DECISION OF
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BoARD.-On an appeal from the finding of the Industrial
Accident Board, held that the finding stood on the same footing as a
verdict of a jury or finding of a court and would not be set aside unless
wholly unsupported by the evidence. it re McPhee, 109 N. E. 633 (Mass.).
PURE FOOD--CHEwING TOBACCO-LABILITY OF MANUFACTURER.-In an action
for Injury resulting from impurities in chewing tobacco, brought on the
theory that tobacco was foodstuff, within the meaning of the exception
to the rule that manufacturers are not liable for injuries caused by Im-
purities of which they were Ignorant, held, that tobacco was not a food-
stuff within the meaning of this exception. Liggett and Meyers Tobacco
Co. v. Cannon, 178 S. W. 1009 (Tenn.).
REMOVAL OF CAUSES-AGREEMENT NOT TO REMOVE SuITS-FOREIGN CORPORA-
TjoNs--DoING BUSINESS WITnIN STATE.-In a suit under Wisconsin
Statutes, 1898, authorizing foreign corporations to do business within the
state, declaring as a condition that such corporations shall state In appli-
cations and annual reports that they will comply with all laws of the
state relative to foreign corporations, the particular section In controversy
being 1770f, added By-Laws 1905, c. 506, which declares that whenever
any foreign corporation doing business in the state shall remove or make
application to remove Into any district of the United States, any action
or proceeding commenced against it by any citizen of the state on a
claim or cause of action arising within the state, it shall be the duty
of the Secretary of the State, on such fact being made known to him, to
revoke the right of the corporation to do business In the state, held, that
such a provision requiring of a foreign corporation, as a condition of being
permitted to or remain In the state, that it stipulate not to exercise Its
constitutional right to remove suits to the Federal courts or prosecute
suits therein is unconstitutional and void, and that the revocation of the
license of the corporation for violation of such a statute may be re-
strained. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Frear, 216 Fed. 199. For a dis-
cussion of the principles Involved In this case see note on page 79 of
this Issue.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PRICE FIXING-PATENTED ARTICLES.
Great Atlantic and Pacigc Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Go., 224 Fed.
566. (Sustained by Judge Lacombe for the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, November 10th.)
1. For the manufacturer of an unpatented food product, not a neces-
sity or a staple article of trade, whose monopoly extends only to the
name under which the product Is distributed, to refuse to supply a re-
taller who will not comply with a request to maintain a certain reason-
able fixed price, Is not such a substantial restraint of trade as to violate
the Clayton Act (Act Oct. 15, 1914, c. 321, 2, 38 Stat. 730), and as to
authorize the court to grant the retailer relief by injunction under Section
16 of said act.
2. The last exception in Section 2 of the Clayton Act authorizes
vendors in interstate commerce to select their bona fide customers, where
the effect Is not to substantially and unreasonably restrain trade.
3. Congress has no constitutional power to authorize the courts to
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
compel a purely private concern to deal with a particular person by in-
junction.
4. A producer may send circulars to its customers asking them not
to supply a certain retailer who is cutting prices.
Ford Motor Car Co. v. Union Motor Sales Company, 225 Fed. 373.
Where a patentee sells an article made under his patent and receives
the full consideration therefor, he has exhausted his exclusive right to
sell and an agreement between him and the purchaser to re-sell at a fixed
price is in restraint of trade and void, though there is a provision that
title shall revert to the patentee if the article Is sold below said price.
United States v. Motion Picture Patent Co., 225 Fed. 800.
1. The motion picture business may be such a trade as comes under
the laws relating to Interstate commerce.
2. If the subject matter of a contract which otherwise would be
Illegal because of restraint of trade, is a patented article, this takes
away the illegality only to the extent which the field of the trade affected
by the contract is co-extensive with the field within which exclusive con-
trol has been granted by the law.
3. Owners of patents may combine for their own protection or one
owner may acquire other patents, unless the direct effect of such com-
bination is to unreasonably restrain trade beyond the protection of the
patents. That their motives are partially to benefit the public is Im-
material.
4. Where owners of patents combine their patents, establish ex-
changes and theatres, and refuse to supply other exchanges and theatres
with the goods produced under their patents, it is a combination In re-
straint of trade beyond what is necessary for the protection of the patents
and is illegal.
American Graphophone Co. v. Boston Store of Chicago, 225 Fed. 785.
1. A patentee upon a sale of the patented article can by contract
require of his immediate vendee the observance of price restriction upon
re-sale.
2. He cannot claim that by a notice he has burdened the article
with such restrictions.
Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S., 1 Distinguished.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR INTENDED USE-EFFECT OF EX-
PRESS WARRANTY IN SAME CONTRAcT.-A contract of sale of motor cars
between a manufacturer and dealer contained express warranties against
defective materials and inherent defects. Suit on implied warranty that
the machines be reasonably fit for use for which they were purchased.
It was contended by the defendant that the express warranty contained
in the written guaranty excluded any implied warranty. Held, that the
implied warranty of fitness was not excluded. Hart-Kraft Motor Co. V.
Indianapolis Motor Car Co., 109 N. E. 39 (Ind.). There is a growing
tendency among the courts of this country to hold that where the war-
ranty of fitness Is independent of the matter contemplated in the express
one, both may exist. 33 L. I. A. (N. S.) 501, Aultman v. Hunter, 82 Mo.
App. 632. The doctrine that an express warranty does not exclude an
implied warranty of title is better established. Benj. on Sales, '99, p. 672.
TAXATION-PROPETY SUBJECT To TAxEs.-Contract obligations as indebted-
ness. In an executory contract for the sale of land, the title remaining
in the vendor until payment. Held, that the unpaid purchase price was
a debt owing to him which might be assessed under statute providing
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for taxation of indebtedness due. Martin v. Wise, 109 N. E. 745. Contract
for purchase of land where purchaser obtained an equitable title, held
to be taxable. J. F. Harris v. W. E. Fravel, 89 Kas. 661. The statutory
liability of a city to pay damages for taking land for a highway, pend-
ing assessment by a jury, is not a debt which is taxable. Powers v. City
of Worcester, 210 Mass. 471. Where a loan is made, the property
transferred to the borrower and the debt accruing to the lender are
distinct and separate interests, each subject to taxation. State V. Clement
Natl. Bk., 78 Vermont 944.
TAXATION - SUCCESSION TAXES - ExERcisE OF PowER - EXTRA-TERITORIAL
EFrEcr.-Exercise of a power by a legatee under a will covering property
located in another state, title to which was in a trustee residing in such
state, held, not subject to a succession tax under statute providing that
an exercise of a power should be deemed a disposition of the property
as by the absolute owner thereof. Walker v. Mansfield, 109 N. E. 647
(Mass.). This is not a direct tax, but a tax on the commodity of the
passing of title. 26 L. R. A. 259. The privilege taxed is that of passing
title under the sanction and protection of the state law. Keeney v. New
York. 222 U. S. 525, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139. The state here extended
no privilege and so might not tax. The Massachusetts court held that a
note made and payable in that state by a partnership having offices in
New York was not subject to the succession tax, but that a registered
bond of the commonwealth likewise owned and kept outside the state,
was subject to the tax in that resort must be had to the aid of the courts
of Massachusetts to compel a transfer of the bond. Bliss v. Bliss, 109
N. E. 148.
WrLLS---CONSTUCTION-SIMULTANEOUs DEATH.-A husband and wife made
their wills each naming the other as primary beneficiary, but in the
event of prior death of the other, making their foster-son sole beneficiary.
There was no evidence as to which died first. Held, that the son should
take, there being no presumption as ta survivorship or simultaneous death,
and it being the evident intention of both that he should take, the wills
should stand as though they contained only one bequest to the son. Fitz-
gerald v. Ayres, 179 S. W. 289.
WILLS--ESTATES CREATED--CONDITION SUBSEQuENT-DIsposITioN or RE-
VERSIONARY INTEREST.-A, sole heir of B, filed a bill in chancery against
the trustees of a home to declare a forfeiture of certain bequests. The
bequests were to the trustees for certain purposes on failure to carry out
which the bequests were to be void and cancelled, and the same to be
held and disposed of as lapsed legacies. Held, that the estate created was
on condition subsequent and though there be a rule that lapsed legacies
should be disposed of as part of the residuary estate, this rule is founded
on the presumption that the intention of the testator in taking the prop-
erty away from the residuary legatee was only for the purpose of the
particular legatee, and that upon the failure of such purpose he intended
that the residuary legatee should have it, therefore, since the forfeiture
clause of the will applied equally to other bequests in the will on condi-
tion subsequent, including the bequest of the residuum, and the applica-
tion of the rule would render nugatory the condition as to the residuary
legatees, the lapsed legacies should go to the heir at law of the testator
as intestate property. Green v. Old People's Home of Chicago, 109 N. E. 701.
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